Abstract-A set of terminals observe correlated data and seek to compute functions of the data using interactive public communication. At the same time, it is required that the value of a private function of the data remains concealed from an eavesdropper observing this communication. In general, the private function and the functions computed by the nodes can be all different. We show that a class of functions are securely computable if and only if the conditional entropy of data given the value of private function is greater than the least rate of interactive communication required for a related multiterminal source-coding task. A single-letter formula is provided for this rate in special cases.
symbolwise maxima. An observer of the communication must not learn of the data of terminals 2, ..., m.
The answer to the general question above remains open. The simplest case of interest when the terminals in a subset A of M compute only the private function g 0 and those not in A perform no computation was introduced in [19] . The data download problem, upon dropping the computation requirements for terminals 2, ..., m, reduces to this setting. It was shown that if g 0 is securely computable (by the terminals in A), then
and g 0 is securely computable if
where R * has the operational significance of being the minimum overall rate of communication needed for a specific multiterminal source-coding task that necessitates the recovery of entire data at all the terminals in A; this task does not involve any security constraint (see Section II for a detailed discussion). Loosely speaking, denoting the collective data of the terminals by the random variable (rv) X M and the random value of the function g 0 by the rv G 0 , the maximum rate of randomness (in the data) that is independent of G 0 is H (X M |G 0 ). The conditions above imply, in effect, that g 0 is securely computable if and only if this residual randomness of rate H (X M |G 0 ) contains an interactive communication, of rate R * , for the mentioned source-coding task. In this paper, for a broad class of settings involving the secure computation of multiple functions, we establish necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computation of the same form as (1) and (2), respectively. The rate R * now corresponds to, roughly, the minimum overall rate of communication that allows each terminal to:
(i) accomplish its required computation task, and, (ii) along with the private function value, recover the entire data.
This characterization of secure computability is obtained via a general heuristic principle that leads to new results and further explains the results of [19] in a broader context. Using the sufficient condition (2), we present a specific secure computing protocol in Section IV with a communication of rate R * . Under (2) , the secure computing scheme in [19] recovered the entire data, i.e., the collective observations of all the terminals, at the (function seeking) terminals in A using communication that is independent of G 0 . In fact, we observe that this is a special case of the following more general principle: a terminal that computes the private function g 0 , may recover the entire data without affecting the conditions for secure computability.
Unlike [19] , we do not provide a single-letter formula for the quantity R * , in general; nevertheless, conditions (1) and (2) provide a structural characterization of securely computable functions in a broader setting, generalizing the results in [19] . A general recipe for single-letter characterization is presented which, in Example 1 and Corollary 4 below, yields single-letter results that are new and cannot be obtained from the analysis in [19] . To the best of our knowledge, the general analysis presented here is the only known method to prove the necessity of the single-letter conditions for secure computability in these special cases. Furthermore, for the cases with single-letter characterizations, the aforementioned heuristic interpretation of R * is made precise (see the remark following Lemma 2 below).
The algorithms for exact function computation by multiple parties, without secrecy requirements, were first considered in [20] , and have since been studied extensively (cf. e.g., [8] , [9] , [10] ). An information-theoretic version with asymptotically accurate (in observation length) function computation was considered in [16] , [11] . The first instance of the exact function computation problem with secrecy appears in [15] . A basic version of the secure computation problem studied here was introduced in [18] , [19] ; [3] gives an alternative proof of the results in [18] , [19] .
The problem of secure computing for multiple functions is formulated in the next section, followed by our results in section III. The proofs are given in sections IV and V. The final section discusses alternative forms of the necessary conditions.
Notation. The set {1, ..., m} is denoted by M. For i < j, denote by [i, j] the set {i, ..., j}. Let X 1 , ..., X m , m ≥ 2, be rvs taking values in finite sets X 1 , ..., X m , respectively, and with a known probability mass function. Denote by X M the collection of rvs (X 1 , ..., X m ), and by X n M = (X M,1 , ..., X M,n ) the n independent and identically distributed (i.i.d). repetitions of the rv X M . For a subset A of M, denote by X A the rvs (X i , i ∈ A). Given R i ≥ 0, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, let R A denote the sum i∈A R i . Denote the cardinality of the range-space of an rv U by U .
Finally, for 0 < ǫ < 1, an rv U is ǫ-recoverable from an rv V if there exists a function g of V such that Pr (U = g(V )) ≥ 1 − ǫ.
II. PROBLEM FORMULATION
We consider a multiterminal source model for function computation using public communication, with a confidentiality requirement. This basic model was introduced in [6] in a separate context of SK generation with public transaction. Terminals 1, . . . , m observe, respectively, the sequences X n 1 , . . . , X n m of length n. For 0 ≤ i ≤ m, let g i : X M → Y i be given mappings, where the sets Y i are finite. Further, for 0 ≤ i ≤ m and n ≥ 1, the (single-letter) mapping
For convenience, we shall denote the rv g
To this end, the terminals are allowed to communicate over a noiseless public channel, possibly interactively in several rounds. Definition 1. An r-rounds interactive communication protocol consists of mappings
where f ij denotes the communication sent by the jth node in the ith round of the protocol; specifically, f ij is a function of X n j and the communication sent in the previous rounds {f kl : 1 ≤ k ≤ i − 1, l ∈ M}. Denote the rv corresponding to the communication by
.., g m ), with private function g 0 , are ǫ nsecurely computable (ǫ n -SC) from observations of length n, and public communication
for every i ∈ M, and (ii) F satisfies the secrecy condition
Remark. The definition of secrecy here corresponds to "weak secrecy" [1] , [13] . When our results have a single-letter form, our achievability schemes for secure computing attain "strong secrecy" in the sense of [14] , [4] , [6] . In fact, when we have a single-letter form, our proof in section IV yields "strong secrecy" upon minor modification.
By definition, for ǫ n -SC functions g M , the private function G 0 is effectively concealed from an eavesdropper with access to the public communication F.
Definition 3.
For private function g 0 , we say that functions g M are securely computable if g M are ǫ n -SC from observations of length n and public communication F = F (n) , such that lim n ǫ n = 0. Figure 1 shows the setup for secure computing.
In this paper, we give necessary and sufficient conditions for the secure computability of certain classes of functions g M = (g 0 , g 1 , ..., g m ). The formulation in [19] , in which the terminals in a given subset A of M are required to compute
.., gm with private function g 0 (only) g 0 securely, is a special case with
It was shown in [19] that (1) and (2) constitute, respectively, necessary and sufficient conditions for the functions above to be securely computable, with R * being the minimum rate of interactive communication F that enables all the terminals in M to attain omniscience (see [6] ), i.e., recover all the data X n M , using F and the decoder side information G n 0 given to the terminals in M \ A. In fact, it was shown that when condition (2) holds, it is possible to recover X n M using communication that is independent of G n 0 . The guiding heuristic in this work is the following general principle, which is also consistent with the results of [19] :
Conditions (1) and (2) where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. Thus, (P1) and (P2) require any terminal computing g 0 to become omniscient, an observation that was also made for the special case in [19] . The first condition (P1) above is straightforward and ensures the computability of the functions g 1 , ..., g m , by the terminals 1, ..., m, respectively. The omniscience condition (P2) facilitates the decomposition of total entropy into mutually independent components that include the random values of the private function G n 0 and the communication F ′ . For the specific case in (3), R * above has a single-letter formula. In general, a single-letter expression for R * is not known. Our results, described in section III, are obtained by simple adaptations of this principle. Unlike [19] , our conditions, in general, are not of a single-letter form. Nevertheless, they provide a structural characterization of secure computability.
As an application, our results provide simple conditions for secure computability in the following illustrative example. Example 1. We consider the case of m = 2 terminals that observe binary symmetric sources (BSS) with underlying rvs X 1 , X 2 with joint pmf given by
where 0 < δ < 1/2. The results of this paper will allow us to provide conditions for the secure computability of the four choices of g 0 , g 1 , g 2 below; it will follow by Theorem 1 that functions g 0 , g 1 , g 2 are securely computable if
and conversely, if the functions above are securely computable, then
where
, and the constant τ = τ (δ) depends on the choice of the function. These characterizations are summarized in the next table. Denote the AND and the OR of two random bits X 1 and X 2 by X 1 .X 2 and X 1 ⊕ X 2 , respectively.
The results for the first two settings follow from [19] . The third and fourth results are new. In these settings, terminal 1 is required to recover the private function; our results below show that the conditions for the secure computability in these cases remain unchanged even if this terminal is required to attain omniscience. Note that since h(δ) < 1 for all 0 < δ < 1/2, there exists a communication protocol for securely computing the functions in the second setting. By contrast, a secure computing protocol for the functions in the third setting does not exist for any 0 < δ < 1/2, since h(δ) > 2δ/3.
III. CHARACTERIZATION OF SECURELY COMPUTABLE

FUNCTIONS
In this section, we characterize securely computable functions for three settings. Our necessary and sufficient conditions entail the comparison of H (X M |G 0 ) with a rate R * ; the specific choice of R * depends on the functions g M . Below we consider three different classes of functions g M . Although the first class is a special case of the second, the two are handled separately as the more restrictive case is amenable to simpler analysis. Furthermore, for m = 2, the obtained necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability take a single-letter form in the first case (see Corollary 4).
(1) In the first class we consider, values of all the functions g 1 , ..., g m must be kept secret. In addition, at least one of the terminals must compute all the functions g 1 , ..., g m . This case arises in distributed function computation over a network where all the computed values are collated at a single sink node, and we are interested in securing the collated function values. Alternatively, denoting the function computed at the sink node by the private function g 0 , the computed functions g 1 , ..., g m can be restricted to be functions of g 0 . Specifically, for 0 < m 0 < m, and for private function g 0 , let
(2) The next case is a relaxation of the previous model in that the restriction
For this general case, our analysis below implies roughly that requiring the terminals [1, m 0 ] that compute the private function g 0 to recover the entire data X n M does not change the conditions for secure computability, which is a key observation of this paper.
(3)
The last class of problems we study is an instance of secure multiterminal source coding, which arises in the data download problems in sensor networks where each node is interested in downloading the data observed by a subset of nodes. Specifically, we consider the situation where each terminal wishes to recover some subset X n Mi of the sources where
This last case appears to be disconnected from the previous two cases a priori. However, our characterizations of secure computability below have the same form for all cases above. Moreover, the same heuristic principle, highlighted in (P1) and (P2), leads to a characterization of secure computability in all three cases. The necessary and sufficient conditions for secure computability are stated in terms of quantities R * i (g M ), i = 1, 2, 3, which are defined next. The subscript i corresponds to case (i) above. In particular, the quantity R * corresponds to the minimum rate of communication needed for an appropriate modification of the source-coding task in (P1), (P2). Below we give specific expressions for R * i , i = 1, 2, 3, along with their operational roles (for a complete description of this role see the sufficiency proof in Section IV).
Denote by R * 1 (g M ) the closure of the (nonempty) set of pairs
for all n ≥ 1 and interactive communication F, where
with the infimum taken over the rates R 1 , ..., R m satisfying the following constraints: 3 The first term accounts for the rate of the communication and the second term tracks the information about G n 0 leaked by F (see (11)) below
The quantity inf n,F R
(1) F corresponds to the solution of a multiterminal source coding problem. Specifically, it is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication that satisfy (P1) and (P2) above (see [5, Theorem 13.15] , [6] ).
Next, let R * 2 (g M ) denote the closure of the set of pairs
with the infimum taken over the rates R 1 , ..., R m and R ′ m0+1 , ..., R ′ m satisfying the following constraints:
The quantity inf n,F R (2) F corresponds to the solution of a multiterminal source coding problem, and is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication F ′ that satisfy (P1) and (P2) above, and additionally satisfies:
This modification corresponds to the introduction of m − m 0 dummy terminals, with the jth dummy terminal observing G n j , m 0 < j ≤ m (see section VI); the dummy terminals can be realized by a terminal
The conditions (P2) and (P3) above correspond to the omniscience at the terminals in the extended model, with G n 0 provided as side information only for decoding. Finally, denote by R * 3 (g M ) the closure of the set of pairs
for all interactive communication F, where
with rates R 1 , ..., R m satisfying the following constraints:
As before, the quantity inf n,F R
F corresponds to the infimum of the rates of interactive communication that satisfy (P1) and (P2) above.
Our main result below characterizes securely computable functions for the three settings above. For i = 1, 2, 3, with functions g 0 , g 1 , . .., g m as in the case (i) above, the functions g M are securely computable if the following condition holds:
Theorem 1.
Conversely, if the functions above are securely computable, then
Remark. Although the first setting above is a special case of the second, it is unclear if for g M in (4) 
The proof is a simple consequence of the definition of
constant has a single-letter form.
Remark. As mentioned before, the quantity inf n,F R (i) F is the infimum of the rates of interactive communication that satisfies (P1), (P2) for i = 1, 3, and satisfies (P1)-(P3) for i = 2. Thus, when the conditions of Lemma 2 hold, we have from Theorem 1 that g M are securely computable if
constant is the minimum rate of communication that satisfies (P1), (P2) for i = 1, 3, and satisfies (P1)-(P3) for i = 2.
As a consequence of Lemma 2, we obtain below a singleletter characterization of securely computable functions, with m = 2, in a special case; the following lemma, which is a special case of [7 
Proof: The constraints (1a) and (1b) satisfied by rates
which further yields
Thus, R (1) constant equals the term on the right side of (13) . Upon manipulating the expression for R (1) F above, we get
constant .
Further, since H (G 2 |G 0 ) = 0, it holds that
, which along with (15) yields
constant , where the last inequality follows from Lemma 3. The result then follows from Lemma 2.
We next derive simple conditions for secure computability for the BSS in Example 1 Example 2. Consider the setup of Example 1, with g 0 = g 1 = X 1 ⊕ X 2 , X 1 .X 2 and g 2 = X 1 .X 2 . By Corollary 4 and the observation H (G 2 |X 2 ) = h(δ)/2, we get R * Example 3. In the setup of Example 1, consider g 0 = g 1 = X 1 ⊕ X 2 and g 2 = X 1 .X 2 . This choice of g 0 , g 1 , g 2 is an instance of case (2) above. For an interactive communication F, the constraints (2a), (2b), (2c) in the definition of R (2) F , upon simplification, reduce to
which further gives
It follows from
as h(δ) > δ for 0 < δ < 1/2. Next, note from (16) that for any interactive communication F
where the last inequality above follows from Lemma 3. The characterization in Example 1 follows from (17), (18) , and H (X 1 , X 2 |G 0 ) = 1, using Lemma 2 and Theorem 1.
IV. PROOF OF SUFFICIENCY IN THEOREM 1
Sufficiency of (9) for i = 1: We propose a two step protocol for securely computing g 0 , g 1 , ..., g m . In the first step, for sufficient large N , the terminals [1, m 0 ] (g 0 -seeking terminals) attain omniscience, using an interactive communication
where ǫ > 0 is sufficiently small. Next, upon attaining omniscience, one of the terminals in [1, m 0 ] computes the following for m 0 < j ≤ m: 
Note that K j ⊕F j denotes the encrypted version of the SlepianWolf codeF j , encrypted with a one-time pad using the secret key (SK) K j . Thus, terminal j, with the knowledge of K j , can recoverF j from K j ⊕F j , and hence can recover G N j . The operation K j ⊕F j is valid since the SK K j has size greater than F j . Furthermore, we have from (19) and (21) that
where the third inequality above uses (20) and the last inequality follows from (21) . The equality in (22) follows from the fact thatF j =F j G N j is a function of G N 0 , since G j is a function of G 0 . We note that this is the only place in the proof where the functional relation between G j and G 0 is used.
Thus, the communication
constitutes the required secure computing protocol for g M . It remains to show the existence of F ′′ and K j , m 0 < j ≤ m that satisfy (19)-(21) .
Specifically, when (9) holds for i = 1, we have from the definition of R * 1 (g M ) in (11) that for all 0 < ǫ ≤ ǫ 0 (ǫ 0 to be specified later), there exists n ≥ 1 and interactive
and R
(1)
where R
F is as in (6) . This further implies that there exist R 1 , ..., R m satisfying (1a) and (1b) (for F) such that
Choosing
we get from (23) and (24) upon simplification:
In Appendix A, we follow the approach in the proof of [19, Theorem 5] and use (25) to show that for sufficiently large k there exists an interactive communication
M of overall rate R M + δ/2 that satisfies the following:
and from
and further,
The proposed communication F ′′ comprises F ′ , F k , and condition (19) follows from (23) and (27). Finally, we show the existence ofF j and K j , m 0 < j ≤ m, as above. From the Slepian-Wolf theorem [17] , there exist rvsF j =F j G N j of rates (20) and (21) for some j ≤ m − 1. Denote by
We have from (25)- (29) that [4] ). This argument is made rigorous using a version of the "balanced coloring lemma" (see [2] , [6] ) given in Appendix B. Specifically, in Lemma B1, set
, and
for some mapping ψ j+1 , where
so that condition (B1)(i) preceding Lemma B1 is met. Condition (B1)(ii), too, is met from the definition of U 0 , h and V .
Upon choosing
in (B2), the hypotheses of Lemma B1 are satisfied for appropriately chosen λ, and for sufficiently large k. Then, by Lemma B1, with
, and with K j+1 in the role of φ, it follows from (B4) that there exists rv
that satisfies (20) and (21), for k sufficiently large. The proof is completed upon repeating this argument for m 0 < j < m.
Sufficiency of (9) for i = 2: The secure computing protocol for this case also consists of two stages. In the first stage, as before, the terminals [1, m 0 ] (g 0 -seeking terminals) attain omniscience, using an interactive communication
The second stage, too, is similar to the previous case and involves one of the omniscience-attaining terminals in [1, m 0 ] transmitting communicationF j =F j G N j to the terminals j, for m 0 < j ≤ m. However, the encryption-based scheme of the previous case is not applicable here; in particular, (22) no longer holds. Instead, the communicationF j now consists of the Slepian-Wolf codewords for G N j given X N j , and previous communication F
′′ . We show below that if (9) holds, then there exist communication F ′′ andF j , m 0 < j ≤ m, of appropriate rate such that the following holds:
for sufficiently large N . Specifically, when (9) holds for i = 2, using similar manipulations as in the previous case we get that for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ 0 , there exist interactive communication F = F (X n M ), and rates
and
of rates R ′ j , m 0 < j ≤ m satisfy the following with high probability, for k sufficiently large (see [5, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14]):
It follows from (31) in a manner similar to the proof in Appendix A that there exist communication
for sufficiently large k. The first stage of the protocol entails transmission of Sufficiency of (9) for i = 3: Using the definition of R * 3 (g M ) and the manipulations above, the sufficiency condition (9) implies that for all 0 < ǫ < ǫ 0 , there exist interactive communication F = F (X n M ), and rates R 1 , ..., R m satisfying (3a), (3b) (for F) such that
follows from (3a) and (3b) that for N = nk the random mappings
of rates R i , 1 ≤ i ≤ m, satisfy the following with high probability, for k sufficiently large (see [5, Lemma 13 .13 and Theorem 13.14]):
. From (32), the approach of Appendix A implies that there exist F ′ i , i ∈ M, as above such that
for sufficiently large k. The interactive communication F ′ , F k constitutes the protocol for securely computing g M , where
Necessity of (10) for i = 1: If functions g M are securely computable then there exists an interactive communication
where ǫ n → 0 as n → ∞. It follows from the Fano's inequality that
Using an approach similar to that in [6] , we have from (33):
where the last step follows from (34) and the assumption that
Continuing with the inequality above, we get
Letting
by (37) R 1 , ..., R m satisfy (1a) and (1b) for F, whereby it follows from (34) and (36) that
F − c 2 ǫ n , where F satisfies (33). Taking the limit n → ∞, and using the definition of R *
Necessity of (10) for i = 2: If g M are securely computable, the approach above implies that there exists an interactive communication F satisfying (33) and (34) such that, with
Furthermore, (34) and the assumption
and similarly, for 
F is as in (7), and F satisfies (33), which completes the proof of necessity (10) for i = 2 upon taking the limit n → ∞.
Necessity of (10) for i = 3: If the functions g M in (5) are securely computable then, as above, there exists an interactive communication F that satisfies (33) and (34). Defining
similar manipulations as above yield
Further, from (34) we get that R 1 , ..., R m satisfy (3a) and (3b) for F. It follows from (41) that
F is as in (8), and F satisfies (33), which completes the proof of necessity (10) for i = 3 as above.
VI. DISCUSSION: ALTERNATIVE NECESSARY CONDITIONS FOR SECURE COMPUTABILITY
The necessary condition (10) for secure computing given in section III is in terms of quantities R (i) F , i = 1, 2, 3, defined in (6), (7), (8), respectively. As remarked before, for i = 1, 3, the quantity inf F R (i) F is the infimum over the rates of interactive communication that satisfy conditions (P1) and (P2). However, this is not true for i = 2. Furthermore, although i = 1 is special case of i = 2, it is not clear if the necessary condition (10) for i = 2 reduces to that for i = 1 upon imposing the restriction in (4) . In this section, we shed some light on this baffling observation.
First, consider the functions g M in (3). For this choice of functions, denoting by R * 0 the minimum rate of interactive communication that satisfies (P1) and (P2), the results in [19] imply that (1) constitutes a necessary condition for secure computability, with R * = R * 0 . Next, consider an augmented model obtained by introducing a new terminal m + 1 that observes rv X m+1 =g (X M ) and seeks to compute g m+1 = ∅. Further, the terminal does not communicate, i.e., observation X n m+1 is available only for decoding. Clearly, secure computability in the original model implies secure computability in the new model. It follows from the approach of [19] that for the new model also, (1) constitutes a necessary condition for secure computability, with R * now being the minimum rate of interactive communication that satisfies (P1) and (P2) when terminal m + 1 does not communicate; this R * is given by
Note that the new necessary condition (1) is
0 }, which is, surprisingly, same as the original condition
Our necessary condition (10) for i = 2 is based on a similar augmentation that entails introduction of m − m 0 new terminals observing g m0+1 (X M ) , ..., g m (X M ) (to be used only for decoding). Now, however, this modification may result in a different necessary condition.
APPENDIX A From (25), we have
where R 1 , ..., R m satisfy conditions (1a) and (1b). For each i and R i ≥ 0, consider a (map-valued) rv J i that is uniformly distributed on the family J i of all mappings X nk i → {1, . . . , ⌈exp(knR i )⌉}, i ∈ M. The rvs J 1 , ..., J m , X nk M are taken to be mutually independent.
Fix ǫ, ǫ ′ , with ǫ ′ > mǫ and ǫ + ǫ ′ < 1. It follows from the proof of the general source network coding theorem [5, Lemma 13.13 and Theorem 13.14] that for all sufficiently large k,
where, for i ∈ M,
Below we shall establish that
appropriately chosen λ, and for sufficiently large k. Then, by Lemma B1, with r = ⌈exp (knR i )⌉ , r ′ = exp knR M\i , and with J i in the role of φ, (A4) follows from (B3) and (B4).
APPENDIX B Our proof of sufficiency in Theorem 1 requires random mappings to satisfy certain "almost independence" and "almost uniformity" properties. The following version of the "balanced coloring lemma" given in [19] constitutes the key step in the derivation of these properties.
Consider rvs U, U ′ , V with values in finite sets U, U ′ , V, respectively, where U ′ is a function of U , and a mapping h : U → {1, . . . , r ′ }. For 0 < λ < 1, let U 0 be a subset of U such that (i) Pr (U ∈ U 0 ) > 1 − λ 2 ; (ii) given the event {U ∈ U 0 , h(U ) = j, U ′ = u ′ , V = v}, there exists u = u(u ′ ) ∈ U 0 satisfying
for 1 ≤ j ≤ r ′ and v ∈ V. Then the following holds.
Lemma B1. Let the rvs U, U ′ , V and the set U 0 be as above. Further, assume that
